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1 Introduction
Revealed preference theory studies conditions under which by observing the choice behavior
of an agent, one can discover the underlying preferences that govern it. Most of the earlier
work on revealed preference theory analyzes consumers’ demand choices from budget sets
(e.g. see Samuelson, 1938, 1948). The underlying premise that choices reveal information
about preferences, however, is applicable to a wide range of choice situations. For example,
applications of the theory to bargaining games (Nash, 1950) characterize bargaining rules
which can be “rationalized” as maximizing the underlying preferences of an impartial ar-
bitrator (or, depending on the interpretation, a social welfare function of the bargainers)
(Peters and Wakker, 1991; Bossert, 1994; Ok and Zhou, 1999; Sánchez, 2000).1
In this paper, we carry out a revealed preference analysis on a class of solutions to simple
allocation problems. A simple allocation problem for a society N is an |N | + 1 dimensional
nonnegative real vector
¡
c1, ...c|N |, E
¢
∈ RN+ satisfying
P
N ci = E where E, the endowment
has to be allocated among agents in N who are characterized by c, the characteristic
vector. Simple allocation problems have a wide range of applications. We discuss them in
detail in Subsection 1.1.
We interpret an allocation rule on simple allocation problems as representing the choices
of a decision-maker (e.g. a public-policy maker, a tax codifier or a bankruptcy judge). We
then examine the conditions under which such a rule can be “rationalized” as maximizing
a (possibly transitive) binary relation or a “utility” function (attributed to the decision-
maker) on the allocation space. (Alternatively, an allocation rule can be interpreted as
representing “social choices” of a group of agents and one can then analyze if these choices
can be rationalized by a “joint-rationale” of the society.)
Note that our interpretation of a rule is different than that of the existing axiomatic
literature on fair allocation (for a survey of which see Thomson, 1998). There, an allocation
rule is typically interpreted as a proposal to the society evaluated by the researcher on the
basis of a set of “desirable” properties. A rule is thus a normative construct. Alternatively,
we interpret a rule to be a positive construct that describes the choices of a decision-maker.
An allocation rule is rational if there is a binary relation whose maximizers coincide with
1Revealed preference theory has also been applied to discuss behavioral phenomena such as the framing
effect (e.g. Rubinstein and Salant, 2006, 2007) or reference dependence (e.g. Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005;
Tapki, 2007; or Bossert and Sprumont, 2007).
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the rule’s choices for every problem. In Section 3, we analyze properties of rational rules.
Theorem 1 states that a rule is rational if and only if it satisfies a standard property called
contraction independence (also called independence of irrelevant alternatives in the context of
bargaining by Nash (1950) and Property α in the context of consumer choice by Sen (1971)).
Peters andWakker (1991) obtain a similar result in the context of bargaining.2 In the context
of consumer choice, however, rationality is stronger than contraction independence.
An allocation rule is transitive-rational if it can be rationalized by a transitive preference
relation. In Section 4, we analyze properties of transitive-rational rules for two agents.
Theorem 2 states that for two agents, every contraction independent (that is, rational) rule
is also transitive-rational. A similar result exists in consumer theory (Rose (1958)). In
bargaining theory, however, contraction independence is weaker than transitive-rationality
(Peters and Wakker, 1991) even for the two-agent case.
In Section 5, we analyze transitive-rational rules for an arbitrary number of agents.
We first observe existence of rational rules that are not transitive-rational. (This is in line
with Gale (1960), Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell, and Sonnenschein (1976), and Peters and Wakker
(1994) for consumer choice and with Peters and Wakker (1991) for bargaining, who show
that counterparts of Theorem 2 do not generalize.) We then observe that all such rules
violate a standard property called other-c monotonicity which requires that a change in the
characteristic value of an agent should not affect other two agents in opposite ways. Other-c
monotonicity is satisfied by most of the known allocation rules in the literature (Thomson,
2003 and 2007). (In the context of single-peaked preferences, a similar idea is formulated
and analyzed by Thomson (1993 and 1997) and Barberà, Jackson, and Neme (1997).) The
main result of this section, Theorem 3, states that every contraction independent rule that
is other-c monotonic is also transitive-rational. To the best of our knowledge, this result is
unique to this domain, that is, we are not aware of similar results on other domains that link
rationality (i.e. contraction independence) to transitive-rationality via auxiliary properties.
In Section 6, we identify conditions under which a rule F is representable by a numerical
function (in the sense that its choices always coincide with the maximizers of the function).
2The critical common features of the two domains that facilitate this result are as follows. First, rules
considered are singleton-valued. Second, both domains are closed under intersection. Note that this second
property does not hold in the context of consumer choice: intersections of budget sets are not always budget
sets.
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Theorem 4 states that every contraction independent and other-c monotonic rule that is also
continuous is representable by a numerical function. It is interesting to note that, unlike
Debreu (1954) and the following literature (such as Peters and Wakker, 1991; Richter, 1966;
or Sondermann, 1982), the proof of Theorem 4 does not make use of a countable order-dense
subset of RN+ . In fact, we show, in Proposition 6, that for simple allocation problems, it is
not possible to construct such a countable collection of sets. For complete binary relations,
existence of a countable order-dense set is both necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a numerical representation. However, since the revealed preference relation is typically
incomplete on our class, we are able to construct a numerical representation.
For a rational rule, the underlying preference relation is independent of the problem
in consideration, particularly of the agents’ characteristics. However, there might be cases
where it is more natural to allow the underlying preferences to depend on this data. In
Section 7, we explore the implications of this alternative. Particularly, we formulate a weak
rationality notion where the representing preference relation is allowed to depend on the
characteristic vector c. Theorem 5 states that every allocation rule satisfies weak rationality:
allowing the objective to depend on the characteristic values, every rule can be rationalized.
A related result is by Young (1987) who characterizes a class of allocation rules which, for
each characteristic vector, maximize an additively separable and strictly concave function.
In this section, we also note that allowing the representing preference relation to depend on
the social endowment E does not effect our findings.
Formally, the class of simple allocation problems is a subclass of the class of bargaining
problems. (However, our results are not mere corollaries of those on bargaining problems.
The more restricted structure of simple allocation problems makes new and interesting re-
lationships between properties possible, such as noted in Theorem 3. At the other hand, as
discussed in Section 6, it makes construction of a numerical representation a harder problem.)
The classes of simple allocation problems and consumer choice problems have nonempty in-
tersection but one class does not contain the other. (We note in Subsection 1.1 that one
application of our analysis is to consumer demand in fixed-price environments).
In the next subsection, we discuss the various applications of our analysis. In Section 2,
we present our model and further discuss rational rules. In the following sections, we present
our results as summarized above.
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1.1 Examples and Applications
A simple allocation problem for a society N is an |N | + 1 dimensional nonnegative real
vector
¡
c1, ...c|N |, E
¢
which, with the exception of the last application below, is interpreted
as follows. A social endowment E of a perfectly divisible commodity is to be allocated among
members of N. Each agent i ∈ N is characterized by an amount ci of the commodity. Next,
we discuss the alternative interpretations of c and E at various applications.
1. Taxation: A public authority is to collect an amount E of tax from a society N. Each
agent i has income ci. This is a central and very old problem in public finance. For
example, see Edgeworth (1898) and the following literature. Young (1987) proposes a
class of “parametric solutions” to this problem.
2. Bankruptcy: A bankruptcy judge is to allocate the remaining assets E of a bankrupt
firm among its creditors, N. Each agent i has credited ci to the bankrupt firm and now,
claims this amount. For example, see O’Neill (1982) and the following literature. For
a detailed review of the extensive literature on taxation and bankruptcy problems, see
Thomson (2003 and 2007).
3. Permit Allocation: The Environmental Protection Agency is to allocate an amount
E of pollution permits among firms in N (such as CO2 emission permits allocated
among energy producers). Each firm i, depending on its location, is imposed by the
local authority an emission constraint ci on its pollution level. For more on this
application, see Kıbrıs (2003) and the literature cited therein.
4. Single-peaked or Saturated Preferences: A social planner is to allocate E units
of a perfectly divisible commodity among members of N. Each agent i is known to
have preferences with peak (saturation point) ci. The rest of the preference information
is disregarded as typical in several well-known solutions to this problem, such as the
Uniform rule or the Proportional rule. For example, see Sprumont (1991) and the
following literature.
5. Demand Rationing: A supplier is to allocate its production E among demanders in
N . Each demander i demands ci units of the commodity. The supply-chain manage-
ment literature contains detailed analysis of this problem.3 For example, see Cachon
3We would like to thank Rakesh Vohra for bringing this application to our attention.
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and Lariviere (1999) and the literature cited therein.
6. Bargaining with Quasilinear Preferences and Claims: An arbitrator is to allo-
cate E units of a numeriare good among agents who have quasilinear preferences with
respect to it. Each agent holds a claim ci on what he should receive. For examples
of bargaining problems with claims, see Chun and Thomson (1992) and the following
literature. For bargaining problems with quasilinear preferences, see Moulin (1985)
and the following literature.
7. Surplus Sharing: A social planner is to allocate the return E of a project among
its investors in N . Each investor i has invested si. The project is profitable, that is,P
N si 5 E. Using the principal that no agent should receive less than his investment,
define the maximal share of an agent i as ci = E −
P
N\{i} sj. Note that
P
N ci = E.
The surplus sharing problem can now be analyzed as a simple allocation problem.
For more on surplus-sharing problems, see Moulin (1985 and 1987) and the following
literature.
8. Consumer Choice under fixed prices and rationing: A consumer has to allocate
his income E among a set N of commodities. The prices of the commodities are fixed
and thus, do not change from one problem to another. (With appropriate choice of
consumption units, normalize the price vector so that all commodities have the same
price.) As typical in the fixed-price literature, the consumer also faces “rationing
constraints” on how much he can consume of each commodity. Let ci be the agent’s
consumption constraint on commodity i. See Benassy, 1993 or Kıbrıs and Küçüks¸enel,
2008, for more on rationing rules.
2 Model
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of agents. For i ∈ N, let ei be the ith unit vector in RN+ .
Let e =
P
N ei. We use the vector inequalities 5, ≤, < . For x, y ∈ RN+ , let x ∨ y =
(max {xi, yi})i∈N . For each E ∈ R+, let ∆ (E) =
©
x ∈ RN+ |
P
N xi = E
ª
. For c ∈ RN+ ,
α ∈ R+, and S ⊆ N, with an abuse of notation, we write
¡
cS, αN\S
¢
to denote the vector
which coincides with c on S and which chooses α for every coordinate in N \ S. For each
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Figure 1: A two-agent simple allocation problem.
A ⊆ RN+ , let comp {A} =
©
x ∈ RN+ | x 5 y for some y ∈ A
ª
be the comprehensive hull of A.
For each x ∈ RN+ and ε ∈ R++, let Vε (x) =
©
y ∈ RN+ | |x− y| < ε
ª
.
A simple allocation problem for N is a pair (c, E) ∈ RN+ × R+ such that
P
N ci =
E (please see Figures 1 and 2). We call E the endowment and c the characteristic
vector. As discussed in Subsection 1.1, depending on the application, E can be an asset or a
liability and c can be a vector or incomes, claims, demands, preference peaks, or consumption
constraints. Let C be the set of all simple allocation problems forN . Given a simple allocation
problem (c, E) ∈ C, let X (c, E) = ©x ∈ RN+ | x 5 c and Pxi 5 Eª be the choice set of
(c, E) .
An allocation rule F : C →RN+ assigns each simple allocation problem (c, E) to an al-
location F (c, E) ∈ X (c, E) such that
P
N Fi (c, E) = E. Note that each rule F satisfies
F (c, E) 5 c. Depending on the application, this might be interpreted as satisfying the
consumption constraints or as an efficiency requirement (as in the case of single-peaked pref-
erences) or that no agent be taxed more than his income. Also,
P
N Fi (c, E) = E can be
interpreted as an efficiency property or, as in taxation, a feasibility requirement or as in
consumer choice, the Walras law.
The following are some well-known examples of rules. The Proportional rule allocates
the endowment proportional to the characteristic values: for each i ∈ N, PROi (c, E) =
7
(E,0,0)
(0,E,0)
(0,0,E) c1
c1
c3
c3
c2 c2
X(c,E)
Figure 2: A three-agent simple allocation problem.
ciS
N cj
E. In the taxation literature, this rule is called a Linear Tax. The Equal Gains rule
allocates the endowment equally, subject to no agent receiving more than his characteristic
value: for each i ∈ N, EGi (c, E) = min {ci, λ}where λ ∈ R+ satisfies
P
N min {ci, λ} = E. In
the single-peaked allocation literature, this rule is called the Uniform rule, in the bankruptcy
literature it is called the Constrained Equal Awards rule, and in the taxation literature, it
is called the Leveling Tax. The Equal Losses rule equalizes the losses agents incur, sub-
ject to no agent receiving a negative share: for each i ∈ N, ELi (c, E) = max {0, ci − λ}
where λ ∈ R+ satisfies
P
N max {0, ci − λ} = E. In the single-peaked allocation litera-
ture, this rule is called the Equal Distance rule, in the bankruptcy literature it is called
the Constrained Equal Losses rule, and in the taxation literature, it is called the Head
Tax. The Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) assigns equal gains until each agent
receives half his characteristic value and then uses the equal losses idea: TAL (c, E) =
EG
¡
1
2
c,min
©
E, 1
2
P
N ci
ª¢
+EL
¡
1
2
c,max {0, E −PN ci}¢ .
For every rule F, we construct an induced revealed preference relation, RF ⊆ RN+ ×
RN+ , as follows: for each x, y ∈ RN+ , xRFy if and only if there is (c, E) ∈ C such that
x = F (c, E) and y ∈ X (c, E) . (Note that x = F (c, E) implies E =
P
N xi.) Similarly, the
strict revealed preference relation induced by F, PF , is defined as xPFy if and only if
xRFy and x 6= y. The lower contour set of x ∈ RN+ with respect to RF is L
¡
x,RF
¢
=
8
©
y ∈ RN+ | xRFy
ª
.
Remark 1 Note that RF is reflexive (since for each x ∈ RN+ , x = F (x,
P
N xi)).
4 Also,
both RF and PF are strictly monotonic (since if x ≥ y, then x = F (x,
P
N xi) and y ∈
X (x,
P
N xi)). Also note that xR
Fy implies
P
N xi =
P
N yi.
A rule F is rational if there is a binary relation B ⊆ RN+ × RN+ such that for each
(c, E) ∈ C, F (c, E) = {x ∈ X (c, E) | for each y ∈ X (c, E) , xBy} . Every rule F induces a
revealed preference relation. But not every rule is rational. Consider rules that satisfy the
following property. A rule F satisfiesWARP (the weak axiom of revealed preferences)
if PF is asymmetric (equivalently if RF is antisymmetric).5
Remark 2 WARP can equivalently be stated as follows: for each pair (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C,
F (c, E) ∈ X (c0, E) and F (c, E) 6= F (c0, E) implies F (c0, E) 6∈ X (c, E). In the statement,
using the same endowment level in both problems is without loss of generality because other-
wise, WARP is trivially satisfied. That is, by the previous remark,
P
N xi <
P
N yi implies
not xPFy.
It is well-known in the literature that WARP is a necessary and sufficient condition for
rationality (Samuelson (1938, 1948) and Houthakker (1950)). The same relationship holds
on our domain (the simple and standard proof is omitted).
Theorem A. A rule F satisfies WARP if and only if it is rational.
For most economic analysis, transitivity of the rationalizing preference relation is an im-
portant requirement.6 A rule F is transitive-rational if there is a transitive binary relation
B ⊆ RN+×RN+ such that for each (c, E) ∈ C, F (c, E) =
©
x ∈ X (c, E) | for each y ∈ X (c, E) , xRFyª .
The following property is necessary and sufficient for rationalizability by a transitive pref-
erence relation (see Richter, 1966; also see Ville, 1946; Houthakker, 1950; Sondermann, 1982;
and Kim, 1987). A rule F satisfies SARP (the strong axiom of revealed preferences)
if PF is acyclic. The same relationship holds on our domain.
4A binary relation B on RN+ is reflexive if for each x ∈ RN+ , xBx. It is strictly monotonic if for each
x, y ∈ RN+ , x ≥ y implies xBy.
5A binary relation B on RN+ is asymmetric if for each x, y ∈ RN+ , xBy implies not yBx. It is antisym-
metric if for each x, y ∈ RN+ , xBy and yBx imply x = y.
6A binary relation B on a space X is transitive if for each x, y, z ∈ X, xBy and yBz imply xBz.
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Theorem B. A rule F satisfies SARP if and only if it is transitive-rational.
A rule that satisfies SARP is rationalizable by the following transitive relation. Given
the revealed preference relation RF , its transitive closure R
F
is defined as follows: for each
x, y ∈ X, xRFy if and only if there are z1, ..., zk ∈ RN+ such that xRFz1RF ...RFzkRFy. Let
P
F
be the asymmetric part of R
F
, that is, xP
F
y if and only if xR
F
y and x 6= y. The lower
contour set of x ∈ RN+ with respect to R
F
is L
³
x,R
F
´
=
n
y ∈ RN+ | xRFy
o
.
A rule F is representable if there is a real-valued function u : RN+ → R such that for
each (c, E) ∈ C,
F (c, E) = arg max
x∈X(c,E)
u (x) .
Every representable rule is transitive-rational (i.e. satisfies SARP). But the converse is not
true.
3 Rationality vs Contraction Independence
In this section, we analyze properties of rational rules. As discussed in the previous section,
rationality is equivalent to the weak axiom of revealed preferences, WARP, which requires
that the induced revealed preference relation be antisymmetric.
Next, we introduce a well-known property from revealed preference theory (as well as bar-
gaining theory). A rule F satisfies contraction independence if a chosen alternative from a
set is still chosen from subsets (contractions) that contain it: for each pair (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C,
F (c, E) ∈ X (c0, E) ⊆ X (c, E) implies F (c0, E) = F (c, E) . In the literature, this property
is also referred to as independence of irrelevant alternatives (Nash, 1950) or Sen’s property
α (Sen, 1971).
Remark 3 Defining contraction independence on problem pairs with the same endowment
E is without loss of generality. To see this, assume the problem pair (c, E) , (c0, E0) ∈ C
satisfies F (c, E) ∈ X (c0, E0) ⊆ X (c, E) . Then F (c, E) ∈ X (c0, E0) implies
P
N Fi (c, E) =
E 5 E0. Furthermore, X (c0, E0) ⊆ X (c, E) implies E0 5 E. Thus, E = E0.
Lemma 1 A rule F satisfies contraction independence if and only if for each (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈
C it satisfies the following properties
Property (i). if for each i ∈ N, min {ci, E} = min {c0i, E} , then F (c, E) = F (c0, E) ,
Property (ii). if F (c, E) 5 c0 5 c, then F (c0, E) = F (c, E) .
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Proof. (⇒) Assume that F satisfies contraction independence. Let (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C. First,
assume that for each i ∈ N,min {ci, E} = min {c0i, E} . Let x ∈ RN+ satisfy
P
N xi 5 E. Then,
x 5 c if and only if x 5 c0. Thus X (c, E) = X (c0, E) . This implies F (c, E) = F (c0, E) .
Next, assume that F (c, E) 5 c0 5 c. Then, F (c, E) ∈ X (c0, E) ⊆ X (c, E) , which by
contraction independence, implies F (c, E) = F (c0, E) .
(⇐) Assume that (i) and (ii) are satisfied. Let (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C be such that F (c, E) ∈
X (c0, E) ⊆ X (c, E) . Then for each i ∈ N, either c0i 5 ci or min {c0i, E} = min {ci, E} .
Let S = {i ∈ N | c0i 5 ci} . Let c00 =
¡
c0S, cN\S
¢
. Then F (c, E) 5 c00 5 c and by (ii) ,
F (c, E) = F (c00, E) . Now, for each i ∈ N, min {c0i, E} = min {c00i , E} . Thus, by (i) ,
F (c00, E) = F (c0, E) . Altogether, we obtain F (c, E) = F (c0, E) .
Property (i) of Lemma 1 is called truncation-invariance for rules on bankruptcy and taxa-
tion problems (Thomson, 2003 and 2007). Property (ii) says that a decrease in characteristic
values does not change the initially chosen allocation as long as it remains feasible.
Contraction independent rules all satisfy the following standard property. A rule F
satisfies own-c monotonicity if an increase in an agent’s characteristic value does not
decrease his share: for each (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C and i ∈ N such that ci < c0i and cN\i = c0N\i,
we have Fi (c, E) 5 Fi (c0, E) .
Lemma 2 If a rule F satisfies contraction independence, then it satisfies own-c monotonic-
ity.
Proof. Let (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C and i ∈ N be such that ci < c0i and cN\i = c0N\i. Sup-
pose Fi (c, E) > Fi (c0, E) . Then since F (c0, E) 5 c 5 c0, contraction independence implies
F (c, E) = F (c0, E) , a contradiction.
Contraction independent rules satisfy another very useful property: if xRFy, it is possible
to identify a set of problems for which x is the solution.
Lemma 3 Assume that F satisfies contraction independence. If xRFy and x 5 c 5 x ∨ y,
then, x = F (c,
P
N xi) . Particularly, x = F (x ∨ y,
P
N xi) .
Proof. If x = y, the statement trivially holds. If x 6= y, since xPFy, x = F (c0, E) for some
(c0, E) ∈ C such that y ∈ X (c0, E) . Then E = PN xi. Note that x 5 c0 and y 5 c0. Thus,
x ∨ y 5 c0. Then applying contraction independence gives the desired result.
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It is interesting to relate Lemma 3 to the concept of an “inverse set” (status-quo set)
in bargaining theory, introduced by Peters (1986) and further analyzed by Peters and Van
Damme (1991). The inverse set of a bargaining rule F at a feasible set S and an allocation
x is the set of disagreement vectors that produce x. Similarly define the inverse set of a
simple allocation rule F at a social endowment level E and an allocation x as the set of c
vectors that produce x. Then Lemma 3 states that the inverse set of every allocation x is
comprehensive down to x.
The main result of this section is as follows.
Theorem 1 A rule F satisfies contraction independence if and only if it satisfies WARP.
Proof. (⇐) Assume that F satisfies WARP. Let (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C be such that F (c, E) ∈
X (c0, E) ⊆ X (c, E) . Suppose F (c, E) 6= F (c0, E) . Then byWARP (Remark 2), F (c0, E) 6∈
X (c, E) . This contradicts X (c0, E) ⊆ X (c, E) .
(⇒) Suppose F violates WARP. Then by Remark 2, there is a pair (c, E) , (c0, E) ∈ C
such that F (c, E) ∈ X (c0, E), F (c0, E) ∈ X (c, E) , and F (c, E) 6= F (c0, E). For each
i ∈ N, let c00i = min {ci, c0i} . Since F (c, E) 5 c and F (c, E) 5 c0, we have F (c, E) 5
c00. Thus,
P
N Fi (c, E) = E 5
P
N c
00
i . That is, (c
00, E) ∈ C. Since F (c, E) 5 c00 5 c,
by contraction independence and Lemma 1, F (c, E) = F (c00, E). Similarly F (c0, E) 5
c00 5 c0, by contraction independence implies F (c0, E) = F (c00, E) , contradicting F (c, E) 6=
F (c0, E) .
Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 together provide us with a simple way of checking whether a
rule satisfiesWARP. Using them, we show that the Proportional rule, the Equal Losses rule,
and the Talmud rule all violate WARP and thus are not rational. The following example
demonstrates this point.
Example 1 The Proportional rule, Equal Losses rule, and the Talmud rule all violate con-
traction independence. Let N = {1, 2} , c = (10, 1) , c0 = ¡10, 10
11
¢
, and E = 10. We show
that, for this example, all three rules violate Property (ii) of Lemma 1. Indeed PRO (c, E) =¡
100
11
, 10
11
¢
5 c0 5 c, EL (c, E) =
¡
91
2
, 1
2
¢
5 c0 5 c, and TAL (c, E) =
¡
91
2
, 1
2
¢
5 c0 5 c.
However, PRO (c0, E) =
¡
110
12
, 10
12
¢ 6= PRO (c, E) , EL (c0, E) = ¡9 6
11
, 5
11
¢ 6= EL (c, E) , and
TAL (c0, E) =
¡
9 6
11
, 5
11
¢ 6= TAL (c, E) . It is trivial to construct another example where all
three rules violate Property (i) of Lemma 1. Finally note that the Equal Gains rule satisfies
Property (ii) for this example: EG (c, E) = (9, 1) and since 1 > c02 the property has no bite.
12
The Equal Gains rule, on the other hand, satisfies WARP. Because, by contrast to the
other three rules, it operates on a principle (equal division) that is independent of the agents’
characteristic values; it only treats them as constraints in the application of this principle.
4 Transitive-Rationality: Two Agents
In this and the following section, we analyze properties of transitive-rational rules. As
discussed in the previous section, transitive-rationality is equivalent to the strong axiom
of revealed preferences, SARP, which requires that the induced revealed strict preference
relation be acyclic.
The main result of this section is that, for two agents, contraction independence is a
necessary and sufficient condition for SARP (i.e. transitive-rationality). We use an auxiliary
result to prove this theorem. It states that for two agents and for allocations on the same
“budget hyperplane”, contraction independence implies transitivity of the revealed preference
relation, a property stronger than acyclicity.
Proposition 4 Let n = 2. Assume F satisfies contraction independence. Let x, y, z ∈ RN+
be such that
P
N xi =
P
N yi =
P
N zi = E. If xP
Fy and yPF z, then xPFz.
Proof. Note that, x 6= y, y 6= z, and since by Theorem 1, PF is asymmetric, x 6= z.Without
loss of generality assume x1 < y1.
Note that, xPFy, by Lemma 3 implies x = F (x ∨ y,E) . Similarly, yPF z, by Lemma 3
implies y = F (y ∨ z, E) .
Case 1: z1 < x1. Since z1 < x1 < y1, x ∨ y ≤ y ∨ z. Thus by contraction independence and
y = F (y ∨ z, E), we have y = F (x ∨ y,E) . This contradicts x = F (x ∨ y, E).
Case 2: x1 < z1 < y1. Then, x = F (x ∨ y, E) and x ≤ x ∨ z ≤ x ∨ y, by contraction
independence implies x = F (x ∨ z, E) . Thus, xPFz.
Case 3: y1 < z1. First suppose F (x ∨ z,E) ∈ (y, z]. Then, F (x ∨ z, E) 5 y ∨ z, by con-
traction independence implies, F (x ∨ z, E) = F (y ∨ z,E) , contradicting y = F (y ∨ z, E) .
Thus, F (x ∨ z, E) 6∈ (y, z]. Next, suppose F (x ∨ z, E) ∈ (x, y]. Then, F (x ∨ z,E) 5
x ∨ y, by contraction independence implies F (x ∨ z, E) = F (x ∨ y, E) , contradicting x =
F (x ∨ y,E) . Thus F (x ∨ z, E) 6∈ (x, y]. Combining these two observations, we conclude
that x = F (x ∨ z, E) . Thus, xPFz.
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Remark 4 Transitivity does not necessarily hold when x, y, and z violate
P
N xi =
P
N yi =P
N zi. For example, let F = EG. This rule satisfies contraction independence. Let x =
(6, 10) , y = (6, 4) , z = (9, 1) . Then, xPFyPF z. However, we do not have xPF z since the
Equal Gains rule always chooses equal division from a set that contains both x and z.
We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 2 Let n = 2. A rule F satisfies contraction independence if and only if it satisfies
SARP.
Proof. First note that SARP implies WARP which in turn implies contraction indepen-
dence. For the converse, assume the F satisfies contraction independence and violates SARP.
Then, there are x1, ..., xk ∈ RN+ such that for each l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} , xlPFxl+1, and xkPFx1.
Then,
P
i∈N x
1
i = ... =
P
i∈N x
k
i =
P
i∈N x
1
i implies
P
i∈N x
1
i = ... =
P
i∈N x
k
i . Then, con-
traction independence, by Proposition 4, implies x1PFx1, contradicting the definition of PF .
5 Transitive-Rationality: n Agents
The main purpose of this section is to identify, for an arbitrary number of agents, conditions
under which a rule is transitive-rational (that is, satisfies SARP). The following example
demonstrates that with more than two agents, Theorem 2 of the previous section fails. A rule
F that satisfies contraction independence can allow cycles of length three or more. Similar
examples exist for both consumer theory (Gale, 1960; Shafer, 1977; Peters and Wakker,
1994) and bargaining theory (Peters and Wakker, 1991).
Example 2 A rule that satisfies contraction independence but violates SARP (please see
Figure 3). Let N = {1, 2, 3} . Let
F (c, E) =



¡
E
3
, E
3
, E
3
¢
if
¡
E
3
, E
3
, E
3
¢
5 c
(c1, c1, E − 2c1) else if c1 < E3 and (c1, c1, E − 2c1) 5 c
(E − 2c2, c2, c2) else if c2 < E3 and (E − 2c2, c2, c2) 5 c
(c3, E − 2c3, c3) else if c3 < E3 and (c3, E − 2c3, c3) 5 c
(c1, c2, E − c1 − c2) else if E − c1 − c2 > c2 and c1 > c2
(c1, E − c1 − c3, c3) else if E − c1 − c3 > c1 and c3 > c1
(E − c2 − c3, c2, c3) else if E − c2 − c3 > c3 and c2 > c3.
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(9,0,0)
(0,9,0)
(0,0,9)
1
z
1
1
y
x
a
Figure 3: A three-agent rule that satisfies contraction independence but violates SARP. For
E = 9, x = F (1, 9, 9, E) , y = F (9, 1, 9, E) , z = F (9, 9, 1, E) .
We will next construct a cycle. Let E = 9, c1 = (1, 9, 9) , c2 = (9, 1, 9) , c3 = (9, 9, 1) ,
x = (1, 1, 7) , y = (7, 1, 1) , and z = (1, 7, 1) . Then F (c1, E) = x, F (c2, E) = y, and
F (c3, E) = z. Noting that x 5 c2, y 5 c3, and z 5 c1, we obtain a violation of SARP due to
xPFzPFyPFx.
Remark 5 The rule presented in the example is continuous. In Peters and Wakker (1991),
continuity prevents cycles of size three (though not bigger cycles). This is not the case in
our framework.
The rule constructed in Example 2 violates a weak property that is satisfied by most
solutions to simple allocation problems. A rule F is other-c monotonic if a change in agent
i’s characteristic value affects any other two agents in the same way: for each (c, E) ∈ C,
each i ∈ N, each c0i ∈ R+ such that (c0i, c−i, E) ∈ C, and each j, k ∈ N \ {i} , Fj (c, E) >
Fj (c0i, c−i, E) implies Fk (c, E) = Fk (c0i, c−i, E) .
It turns out that contraction independent rules that are other-c monotonic induce a
revealed preference relation that is transitive on a fixed endowment level.
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Proposition 5 Assume that F satisfies contraction independence and other-c monotonic-
ity. Let x, y, z ∈ RN+ be such that
P
N xi =
P
N yi =
P
N zi = E. If xP
Fy and yPFz, then
xPFz.
Proof. Note that, x 6= y, y 6= z, and since by Theorem 1, PF is asymmetric, x 6= z. By
Lemma 3, x = F (x ∨ y, E) and y = F (y ∨ z,E) . We claim x = F (x ∨ y ∨ z,E) . This, by
contraction independence implies x = F (x ∨ z,E) , the desired conclusion. Contrary to the
claim, suppose w = F (x ∨ y ∨ z, E) 6= x.
If w 5 x∨y, by contraction independence, w = F (x ∨ y, E) , contradicting w 6= x. Thus,
the set Sx = {i ∈ N | max {xi, yi} < wi} is nonempty.
If w 5 y∨z, by contraction independence, w = F (y ∨ z,E) = y, contradicting w 65 x∨y.
Thus, the set Sy = {i ∈ N | max {yi, zi} < wi} is nonempty.
If there is i ∈ Sx ∩ Sy, max {xi, yi, zi} < wi contradicts w 5 x ∨ y ∨ z. So Sx ∩ Sy = ∅.
Let c =
¡
wSy , 0N\Sy
¢
. Then w 5 y ∨ z ∨ c, by contraction independence implies w =
F (y ∨ z ∨ c, E) . Since y = F (y ∨ z, E) , Lemma 2 and other-c monotonicity implies that
for each j 6∈ Sy, yj = wj.7
Now let j ∈ Sx. Then by definition, max {xj, yj} < wj. Since j 6∈ Sy however, by the
previous paragraph, yj = wj, a contradiction.
We now use this proposition to prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 3 If a rule F satisfies contraction independence and other-c monotonicity, then
it satisfies SARP.
Proof. Assume the F satisfies contraction independence, other-c monotonicity and violates
SARP. Then, there are x1, ..., xk ∈ RN+ such that for each l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} , xlPFxl+1 and
xkPFx1. Then,
P
i∈N x
1
i = ... =
P
i∈N x
k
i =
P
i∈N x
1
i implies
P
i∈N x
1
i = ... =
P
i∈N x
k
i .
Then contraction independence and other-c monotonicity, by Proposition 5, imply x1PFx1,
contradicting the definition of PF .
The following example demonstrates that the converse of Theorem 3 is not true: while
SARP implies WARP, it does not imply other-c monotonicity.
7To see this, let i ∈ Sy. As ci decreases from wi to max {yi, zi} , by Lemma 2, i0s share does not increase.
By feasibility and other-claim monotonicity, the share of every j 6= i does not decrease. Repeating this
argument for each i ∈ Sy, we conclude that the share of a j 6∈ Sy does not decrease, that is, yj = wj .
16
Example 3 A rule that satisfies SARP but violates other-c monotonicity. Let N = {1, 2, 3} .
Let
F (c, E) =



¡
E
3
, E
3
, E
3
¢
if
¡
E
3
, E
3
, E
3
¢
5 c
(c1, c1, E − 2c1) else if c1 < E3 and (c1, c1, E − 2c1) 5 c¡
E−c2
2
, c2, E−c22
¢
else if c2 < E3 and
¡
E−c2
2
, c2, E−c22
¢
5 c¡
E−c3
2
, E−c3
2
, c3
¢
else if c3 < E3 and
¡
E−c3
2
, E−c3
2
, c3
¢
5 c
(c1, c2, E − c1 − c2) else if E − c1 − c2 > c1 and c1 > c2
(E − c2 − c3, c2, c3) else if E − c2 − c3 > c3 and E − c2 − c3 > c2
(c1, E − c1 − c3, c3) else if E − c1 − c3 > c1.
To see that F violates other-c monotonicity, note that F (E,E,E,E) =
¡
E
3
, E
3
, E
3
¢
and
F
¡
E
4
, E,E,E
¢
=
¡
E
4
, E
4
, E
2
¢
. F satisfies SARP because a problem from which
¡
E−c2
2
, c2, E−c22
¢
is chosen never contains a point of type
¡
E−c3
2
, E−c3
2
, c3
¢
and thus, it is not possible to con-
struct a cycle.
6 Representability
The main purpose of this section is to identify conditions under which a rule F is repre-
sentable by a numerical function. The main result of this section, Theorem 4 states that
every contraction independent and other-c monotonic rule that is also continuous is repre-
sentable by a numerical function.
The best-known method of constructing such a numerical representation is finding, if
possible, a countable set A ⊆ RN+ which is P
F
-dense: for each x, y ∈ RN+ \A, if xPFy, then
there is a ∈ A such that xPFaPFy. Following Debreu (1954), Peters and Wakker (1991),
Richter (1966), and Sondermann (1982) construct such sets to prove representability of choice
rules. The following result demonstrates that in simple allocation problems, no such set A
can be constructed.
Proposition 6 Let F be an arbitrary rule. Then, there is no countable set A ⊆ RN+ which
is P
F
-dense.
Proof. Let A be a P
F
-dense set. For each E ∈ R+, let xE = F (EN , E) and let yE ∈
∆ (E) \ ©xEª . Then, xEPFyE and thus, there is aE ∈ A such that xEPFaEPFyE. By
17
Remark 1,
P
xEi =
P
aEi =
P
yEi . Thus,
P
aEi = E. So for E
0 6= E, aE0 6= aE. Since there
is uncountably many E, the set A is then also uncountable.
For complete binary relations, existence of a countable order-dense set is both necessary
and sufficient for representability. However, since P
F
is possibly incomplete, this is only a
sufficient condition. So, Proposition 6 only means that we will have to pursue a different
path than Debreu (1954) and the following papers.
For each rule F, we define the associated function uF : RN+ → R so that the numerical
value of an alternative x ∈ RN+ is the Lebesque measure, µ, of an extension of its lower-
contour set (please see Figure 4):
uF (x) = µ
³
comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o´
.
That is, to obtain the value of an alternative x, we move up L
³
x,R
F
´
(its lower contour
set with respect to the transitive R
F
) by the unit vector e and then calculate the Lebesque
measure of the comprehensive hull of this set. This operation (of moving up by e and taking
the comprehensive hull) guarantees that for every x ∈ RN+ (particularly, those vectors at the
boundary of RN+), comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
is a set of positive measure.
Also note that, replacing L
¡
x,RF
¢
with L
³
x,R
F
´
in the above representation does
not work. For example if F is the Equal Gains rule, x = (11, 10) and y = (10, 10),
µ
¡
comp
©
L
¡
x,RF
¢
+ {e}ª¢ = 192 < µ ¡comp©L ¡y,RF¢+ {e}ª¢ = 241 even though xPFy.
A rule F is c-continuous if for each E ∈ R+, F (., E) is a continuous function. It is
E-continuous if for each c ∈ RN+ , F (c, .) is a continuous function. Finally, a rule F is con-
tinuous if it is both c-continuous and E-continuous. The following example demonstrates
that our construction does not work for rules that violate either continuity property.
Example 4 (A discontinuous rule that is not representable by uF ) Let N = {1, 2} . Let F
be defined as
F (c, E) =



EG (c, E) if E < 2,
(min {c1, E} , E −min {c1, E}) if 2 5 E < 3,
(E, 0) if 3 5 E, c1 = E,
EG (c, E) if 3 5 E, c1 < E.
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x2
x1
45 
o
x
(-1,-1)
Figure 4: The sets L
¡
x,RF
¢
(the red-shaded trapezoid), L
³
x,R
F
´
(the trapezoid plus the
blue-shaded triangle), and comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
(the trapezoid and the triangle plus the
green-shaded rectangular area).
Now let x = (2, 0), y = (1, 1) , z = (4, 0) , and w = (2, 2) . Since x = F (2, 2, 2) , xP
F
y.
However, since F violates E-continuity at E = 2, uF (x) = 2 = uF (y) . Similarly, since
z = F (4, 4, 4) , zP
F
w. However, since F violates c-continuity at c1 = E = 4, uF (z) = 8 =
uF (w) .
The main result of this section, Theorem 4, shows that any contraction independent,
other-c monotonic, and continuous rule is representable by a numerical function of the above
form. To prove it, we use a series of lemmas presented next.
The following lemma shows that the set of characteristic vectors that deliver the same
alternative have a lattice structure.
Lemma 7 Let F be contraction independent and other-c monotonic. If F (c, E) = F (c0, E) =
x, then F (c ∨ c0, E) = x.
Proof. Suppose F (c ∨ c0, E) = y 6= x. Let S = {i ∈ N | yi > ci} and S0 = {i ∈ N | yi > c0i} .
If S = ∅, then y 5 c and, by contraction independence, F (c, E) = y, a contradiction. Thus
S 6= ∅. Similarly, S0 6= ∅. Also, y ∈ X (c ∨ c0, E) implies S∩S0 = ∅. Now, let c00 = ¡yS, 0N\S¢
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and note that, by contraction independence, y = F (c ∨ c00, E) . Since x = F (c, E) , by
Lemma 2 and other-c monotonicity, for each i 6∈ S, xi = yi. Now let j ∈ S0. Then, xj 5
c0j < yi. Since j 6∈ S, also xj = yj, a contradiction.
The following lemma shows that other-c monotonic and c-continuous rules choose bound-
ary allocations under certain contractions of the feasible set.
Lemma 8 Assume that F is contraction independent and c-continuous. Then, for each
(c, E) ∈ C, i ∈ N, and δ ∈ R+, Fi (c+ δei, E) > ci implies Fi (c, E) = ci.
Proof. Let (c, E) ∈ C, i ∈ N, and δ ∈ R+ satisfy Fi (c+ δei, E) > ci. Suppose Fi (c, E) < ci.
Then by c-continuity, there is ε < δ such that Fi (c+ εei, E) = ci. But then, F (c+ εei, E) 5
c 5 c+ εei, by contraction independence, implies F (c, E) = F (c+ εei, E) , a contradiction.
The following lemma uses the previous to establish an even stronger boundary condition
for other-c monotonic rules.
Lemma 9 Assume that F satisfies contraction independence, c-continuity, and other-c
monotonicity. Let (c, E) ∈ C and x ∈ ∆ (E) be such that x 5 c, there is i ∈ N such
that xi < Fi (c, E) , and there is c∗ 5 c such that (c∗, E) ∈ C and x = F (c∗, E) . Then
xi = c∗i .
Proof. Let F
³
c∗i , c
∗
N\i, E
´
= x. Let j ∈ N \ {i} . Since, c∗j 5 cj, by Lemma 2, we have
xj 5 Fj
³
c∗i , cj, c
∗
N\ij, E
´
. By other-c monotonicity then, xi = Fi
³
c∗i , cj, c
∗
N\ij, E
´
. Replacing
each c∗j with cj, we conclude
c∗i = xi = Fi
¡
c∗i , cN\i, E
¢
.
Since xi < Fi (c, E) , we have F
¡
c∗i , cN\i, E
¢ 6= F (c, E) . If Fi (c, E) 5 c∗i , contraction in-
dependence implies F
¡
c∗i , cN\i, E
¢ 6= F (c, E) , a contradiction. Thus, Fi (c, E) > c∗i . Then
contraction independence and c-continuity, by Lemma 8, imply Fi
¡
c∗i , cN\i, E
¢
= c∗i . Thus,
xi = c∗i .
The following lemma shows that the lower contour set of each alternative x is equal to
the feasible set of a particular problem where each ci is either xi or
P
N xi.
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Lemma 10 Let F be contraction independent, other-c monotonic, and continuous. Then
for each x ∈ RN+ , there is cx ∈ RN+ such that L
¡
x,RF
¢
= X (cx,
P
N xi) . Furthermore, if
there is i ∈ N such that cxi <
P
N xi, then c
x
i = xi.
Proof. Let x ∈ RN+ and let E =
P
N xi.
Step 1: There is cx ∈ RN+ such that L
¡
x,RF
¢
= X
¡
cx, E
¢
.
Let Cx =
©
c ∈ RN+ |
P
N ci = E, c 5 EN , F
¡
c, E
¢
= x
ª
. By continuity of F, Cx is com-
pact. Let
cx ∈ argmax
c∈Cx
X
N
ci.
By continuity of
P
N ci and compactness of C
x, such cx exists. By Lemma 7, cx is unique.
We claim that for each c ∈ Cx, X
¡
c, E
¢
⊆ X
¡
cx, E
¢
, that is, c 5 cx. To see this, suppose
there is c ∈ Cx such that c 65 cx. Let c0 = c∨ cx and note that c0 ≥ cx. By Lemma 7, c0 ∈ Cx.
But then
P
N c
0
i >
P
N c
x
i , a contradiction.
Now let
¡
c, E
¢
∈ C such that F ¡c, E¢ = x. We claim, X ¡c, E¢ ⊆ X ¡cx, E¢ . If c 5 EN ,
by the previous paragraph, X
¡
c, E
¢
⊆ X
¡
cx, E
¢
. If c 65 EN , the set S =
©
i ∈ N | ci > E
ª
is nonempty. Let c0 =
¡
ES, cN\S
¢
and note that, since c0 ∈ Cx, X
¡
c0, E
¢
⊆ X
¡
cx, E
¢
. Since
X
¡
c, E
¢
= X
¡
c0, E
¢
, we also have X
¡
c, E
¢
⊆ X
¡
cx, E
¢
.
Since cx ∈ Cx, X
¡
cx, E
¢
⊆ L
¡
x,RF
¢
. Conversely, let y ∈ L
¡
x,RF
¢
. Then there is¡
c, E
¢
∈ C such that F ¡c, E¢ = x and y ∈ X ¡c, E¢ . By the previous paragraph, X ¡c, E¢ ⊆
X
¡
cx, E
¢
. Thus, y ∈ X
¡
cx, E
¢
. These two set inclusions give the desired result.
Step 2: If there is i ∈ N such that cxi < E, then cxi = xi.
If there is i ∈ N such that cxi < E, F
³
Ei, cxN\i, E
´
6= x. (Otherwise,
³
Ei, cxN\i
´
∈ Cx
and
³
Ei, cxN\i
´
≥ cx, a contradiction.) By contraction independence, Fi
³
Ei, cxN\i, E
´
> cxi .
Thus xi < Fi
³
Ei, cxN\i, E
´
. This, by Lemma 9, implies xi = cxi .
The following lemma establishes that in a neighborhood of x, L
¡
x,RF
¢
and L
³
x,R
F
´
coincide.
Lemma 11 Let F be contraction independent, other-c monotonic, and continuous. Then
for each x ∈ RN+ , there is δ ∈ R++ such that if E ∈ (
P
N xi − δ,
P
N xi] and y ∈ L
¡
x,RF
¢
∩
∆ (E) , then L
¡
y,RF
¢
⊆ L
¡
x,RF
¢
.
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Proof. Let F satisfy the given properties. Let x ∈ RN+ and let E =
P
N xi. By Lemma 10,
there is S ⊆ N such that for cx =
¡
xS, EN\S
¢
, L
¡
x,RF
¢
= X
¡
cx, E
¢
.
If S = ∅, the statement holds for all δ. To see this, first note that then, L
¡
x,RF
¢
=
X
¡
EN , E
¢
. Let y ∈ L
¡
x,RF
¢
. By Lemma 10, there is cy ∈ [0, E]N such that L
¡
y,RF
¢
=
X (cy,
P
N yi) . But c
y 5 EN and
P
N yi 5 E. Thus, L
¡
y,RF
¢
⊆ L
¡
x,RF
¢
.
Alternatively assume S 6= ∅.
Step 1: If T ⊆ N is such that T 6⊇ S, then x 6= F ¡xT , EN\T , E¢ . To see this, suppose
otherwise. Let c =
¡
xT , EN\T
¢
and note that c ∨ cx ≥ cx. By Lemma 7, x = F
¡
c ∨ cx, E
¢
.
But then, L
¡
x,RF
¢
⊇ X
¡
c ∨ cx, E
¢
⊃ X
¡
cx, E
¢
, a contradiction.
Step 2: If T ⊆ N is such that T 6⊇ S, then F ¡xT , EN\T , E¢ 6∈ X ¡cx, E¢ . To see this,
suppose otherwise. Note that x ∈ X
¡
xT , EN\T , E
¢
. Thus, by contraction independence
(which by Theorem 1, is equivalent to WARP) and by Remark 2, F
¡
xT , EN\T , E
¢
= x,
contradicting Step 1.
Step 3: Defining ε and δ. Let
ε =
1
2
min
©¯¯
x− F
¡
xT , EN\T , E
¢¯¯ | T ⊆ N such that T 6⊇ Sª .
By Step 1, ε > 0. Now let T ⊆ N be such that T 6⊇ S. By continuity of F, there is a real
number δT > 0 such that E ∈
¡
E − δT , E
¤
implies F
¡
xT , EN\T , E
¢
∈ Vε
¡
F
¡
xT , EN\T , E
¢¢
.
Let δ = min {δT | T ⊆ N such that T 6⊇ S} .
Step 4: If E ∈
¡
E − δ, E
¤
and T ⊆ N is such that T 6⊇ S, then F ¡xT , EN\T , E¢ 6∈
X
¡
cx, E
¢
. By Step 3, F
¡
xT , EN\T , E
¢
∈ Vε
¡
F
¡
xT , EN\T , E
¢¢
. Noting that, by definition
of ε, Vε
¡
F
¡
xT , EN\T , E
¢¢
∩X
¡
cx, E
¢
= ∅, we have the desired conclusion.
Step 5: If E ∈
¡
E − δ, E
¤
, y ∈ X
¡
cx, E
¢
∩ ∆ (E) , and T ⊆ N is such that T 6⊇ S,
then F
¡
yT , EN\T , E
¢ 6= y. To see this, first note that, by Step 4, F ¡xT∩S, EN\(T∩S), E¢ 6∈
X
¡
cx, E
¢
. (Note that T ∩ S = ∅ or T ∩ S = T are both possible.) Thus, there is i ∈ S \ T
such that Fi
¡
xT∩S, EN\(T∩S), E
¢
> xi. Since xT∩S = yT∩S and i 6∈ T, by Lemma 2 and
other-c monotonicity, Fi
¡
yT , EN\T , E
¢
= Fi
¡
xT∩S, EN\(T∩S), E
¢
. Since y ∈ X
¡
cx, E
¢
and
i ∈ S, yi 5 xi. Together, Fi
¡
yT , EN\T , E
¢
> yi. Thus, F
¡
yT , EN\T , E
¢ 6= y.
Step 6: If E ∈
¡
E − δ, E
¤
and y ∈ X
¡
cx, E
¢
∩∆ (E) , then L
¡
y,RF
¢
⊆ L
¡
x,RF
¢
. To see
this, first note that, by Lemma 10, there is T ⊆ N such that for cy =
¡
yT , EN\T
¢
, we have
L
¡
y,RF
¢
= X (cy, E) . By Step 5, T 6⊇ S implies F (cy, E) 6= y. Thus, T ⊇ S. Then, cy 5 cx
and E 5 E implies X (cy, E) ⊆ X
¡
cx, E
¢
. That is, L
¡
y,RF
¢
⊆ L
¡
x,RF
¢
.
22
We next present the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 If a rule F is contraction independent, other-c monotonic, and continuous,
then it is representable by a function uF .
Proof. Let F satisfy the given properties. First assume that for each x, y ∈ RN+ such that
xPFy, we have uF (x) > uF (y) . Then, uF represents F. To see this, let (c, E) ∈ C. For each
y ∈ X (c, E) \ {F (c, E)} , we have F (c, E)PFy and thus, uF (F (c, E)) > uF (y) . Therefore,
F (c, E) = argmaxx∈X(c,E) uF (x) .
We next show that for each x, y ∈ RN+ such that xPFy, we have uF (x) > uF (y) . Let
x, y ∈ RN+ satisfy xPFy. Then, by Remark 1,
P
N xi =
P
N yi. Also note that, by definition
of uF and transitivity of R
F
, uF (x) = uF (y) . We next show that equality is not possible.
Case 1:
P
N xi >
P
N yi. Let ε =
1
2
(
P
N xi −
P
N yi) . Then
Vε (x+ e) ∩ comp {x+ {e}} ⊆ comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
\ comp
n
L
³
y,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
and
µ (Vε (x+ e) ∩ comp {x+ {e}}) > 0.
Thus,
uF (x)− uF (y) = µ (Vε (x+ e) ∩ comp {x+ {e}}) > 0.
Case 2:
P
N xi =
P
N yi. Let E =
P
N xi. By Lemma 10, there is c
x, cy ∈ RN+ such that
L
¡
x,RF
¢
= X
¡
cx, E
¢
and L
¡
y,RF
¢
= X
¡
cy, E
¢
.
Step 1: Defining δ1, δ2, and ε. Since x 6∈ L
¡
y,RF
¢
, there is i ∈ N such that xi > cyi . Let
δ1 = 12 |xi − cyi | . Note that, z ∈ Vδ1 (x) implies z 6∈ L
¡
y,RF
¢
. Next, by Lemma 11, there is
δ2 ∈ R++ such that if E ∈
¡
E − δ2, E
¤
and z ∈ L (y,R)∩∆ (E) , then L
¡
z,RF
¢
⊆ L
¡
y,RF
¢
.
Let ε = min {δ1, δ2} and note that ε > 0.
Step 2: If z ∈ L
³
y,R
F
´
, then z 6∈ Vε (x) . If
P
N zi 5 E−ε, then z 6∈ Vε (x) trivially holds.
Alternatively assume
P
N zi > E−ε. Since z ∈ L
³
y,R
F
´
, there is w1, ..., wk ∈ RN+ such that
y = w1PFw2PF ...P Fwk = z. Let l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} . Then,PN wli =PN zi > E−ε = E−δ2.
Thus, if wl ∈ L
¡
y,RF
¢
, by Lemma 11, L
¡
wl, RF
¢
⊆ L
¡
y,RF
¢
. SincewlPFwl+1, this implies
wl+1 ∈ L
¡
y,RF
¢
. Overall, w1 ∈ L
¡
y,RF
¢
and for each l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} , wl+1 ∈ L ¡y,RF¢ .
Therefore, z ∈ L
¡
y,RF
¢
. This and ε 5 δ1 implies z 6∈ Vε (x) .
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Step 3: uF (x) > uF (y). By Step 2, Vε (x) ∩ L
³
y,R
F
´
= ∅. Particularly, as noted in Step
1, there is i ∈ N such that xi − ε > cyi . We now claim
Vε (x+ e) ∩ comp
n
L
³
y,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
= ∅.
To see this, let z ∈ Vε (x+ e) and w ∈ comp
n
L
³
y,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
. Then, zi > xi + 1 − ε >
cyi + 1 = wi implies z 6= w.
Now note that Vε (x)∩L
³
x;R
F
´
6= ∅ implies Vε (x+ e)∩
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
6= ∅. Thus
Vε (x+ e) ∩ comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
6= ∅.
Since comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
has dimension n and contains x,
µ
³
Vε (x+ e) ∩ comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o´
> 0.
Finally, since
Vε (x+ e)∩ comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
⊆ comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
\comp
n
L
³
y,R
F
´
+ {e}
o
,
we have
uF (x)− uF (y) = µ
³
Vε (x+ e) ∩ comp
n
L
³
x,R
F
´
+ {e}
o´
> 0.
Thus, uF (x) > uF (y) .
7 Weaker Notions of Rationality
In this section, we explore the implications of natural weakenings of rationality. Rationality
requires the existence of a binary relation which is independent of the data of a given problem.
However, there might be cases where it is more natural to allow the underlying preferences
to depend on the social endowment or the characteristic vector.
We start by noting that allowing the underlying preferences to depend on the social
endowment E does not affect our results. To see this, note that our results do not utilize
properties that relate solutions to problems with different social endowment levels. Thus,
our whole analysis would be true under a fixed endowment level, say E = 1. It is interesting
to note that then, by Propositions 4 and 5, contraction independence (and for n > 2, other-c
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monotonicity) imply transitivity of the revealed preference relation RF . Also note that then,
in Theorem 4, continuity can be replaced with c-continuity.
Allowing the underlying preferences to depend on the characteristic vector has more
radical implications. We discuss them next. Formally, a rule F is weakly rational if for
each c ∈ RN+ , there is a binary relation B (c) ⊆ RN+ × RN+ such that for each (c, E) ∈ C,
F (c, E) = {x ∈ X (c, E) | for each y ∈ X (c, E) , xB (c) y} .
It turns out that every rule satisfies this weak property.
Theorem 5 Every rule F is weakly rational.
Proof. Let c ∈ RN+ . We first claim that F (c, .) satisfies WARP. To see this, define the
revealed preference relation induced by c, RF (c) as follows: for each x, y ∈ RN+ , xRF (c) y
if and only if there is E ∈ R+ such that (c, E) ∈ C, x = F (c, E) and y ∈ X (c, E) . Next,
we show that RF (c) is antisymmetric: assume xRF (c) y and yRF (c)x. Let Ex be such
that x = F (c, Ex) and y ∈ X (c, Ex) . Similarly, let Ey be such that y = F (c, Ey) and
x ∈ X (c, Ey) . Then
P
N xi 5 Ey =
P
N yi 5 Ex =
P
N xi. Thus, E
x = Ey. But then,
x = F (c, Ex) and y = F (c, Ey) together imply x = y.
Now let E ∈ R+ be such that (c, E) ∈ C. Then by definition of RF (c) , for each y ∈
X (c, E) , F (c, E)RF (c) y and (by antisymmetry of RF (c)) for each y ∈ X (c, E)\{F (c, E)},
not yRF (c)F (c, E) . Thus, F (c, E) =
©
x ∈ X (c, E) | for each y ∈ X (c, E) , xRF (c) yª .
Since this argument is true for each c ∈ RN+ , F is weakly rational.
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